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A Psychological Approach to Understanding the Legal 
Basis of the No Duty to Rescue Rule* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Two years ago a college-age male raped and killed a girl in a casino 
in Las Vegas.1 The killer was at the casino with a friend, and there is evi-
dence that the friend knew what was happening and did nothing to stop 
the rape.2 Many questioned why no charges were being brought against 
the friend, why he had no legal duty to help this girl who his friend had 
raped and murdered.3 Similarly, in the early sixties, Kitty Genovese was 
repeatedly attacked over a period of thirty-five minutes, during which 
time thirty-eight of her New York neighbors saw what was happening 
and did not summon help.4 
Is a person who sees another in danger obligated to help in some 
way? In order to establish a cause of action for negligence, there must be 
a breach of some legal duty.5 In the United States, there is generally no 
legal duty to rescue.6 
A sees B, a blind man, about to step into the street in front of an ap-
proaching automobile. A could prevent B from so doing by a word or 
touch without delaying his own progress. A does not do so, and B is 
run over and hurt. A is under no duty to prevent B from stepping into 
the street, and is not liable to B.7 
One professor relates her experience teaching torts to her students, a 
majority of whom find the "legal 'no duty' rule reprehensible."8 How-
ever, after the rule and its rationale are explained to the students, and 
they are able to "take a distanced, objective posture informed by liberal-
Copyright© 2000 by David N. Kelley. 
I. See Life in Prison for Killer of Girl in Casino, CHI. TRm., Oct. 15, 1998, at 14. 
2. See id. 
3. See id. 
4. See A.M. ROSENTHAL, THIRTY-EIGHTWITNESSES 11-14 (1964). 
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 314 (1965). 
6. See Saul Levmore, Waiting for Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Struc-
ture of the Law of Ajfi171Ultive Obligations, 72 VA. L. REV. 879 (1986). There are some exceptions to 
this rule which will be discussed later. 
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 314 cmt. c, illus. 1 (1965). 
8. Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31, 
33 (1988). 
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ism's concerns for autonomy and liberty, [and] many come to accept the 
legal rule that intuitively had seemed so wrong to them."9 It may be dis-
turbing to think that a person walking along the shore of a lake, who sees 
a victim drowning, has no legal duty to throw a rope, or reach a stick out 
to help that person. 10 This is the case even if there is no hint of danger to 
the potential rescuer. Neither tort law nor criminal law has recognized 
general liability for failure to act. 
Scholars have both criticized and supported the no duty to rescue 
rule. Those who criticize the rule suggest it is inefficient, detached, or 
individualistic." Those who support the rule suggest that "legal induce-
ments may impede [the] motivation" of a rescuer helping for altruistic 
reasons, or out of desire to be regarded as a hero. 12 Supporters of the cur-
rent law have also suggested that the law should not impose morality on 
individuals, and that the cost on individuals may be too great if liability 
is imposed. 13 Two major approaches that have been taken to understand 
and explain the law as it stands are (1) law and economics, and (2) moral 
considerations. 
While it seems there would be a positive impact on society if the 
courts or legislatures would impose some sort of duty to rescue, social 
scientific research seems to indicate that any legal duty should be applied 
with careful limits. 14 Part II of this Comment wiii explore the nature of 
the common law no duty to rescue rule including the numerous excep-
tions which have been imposed by the courts through its history. Part III 
wiii summarize and explain the position of those who use law and eco-
nomics to either support or criticize the law. Part IV will discuss ethical 
arguments in favor and against the no duty to rescue rule. Finally, Part V 
will analyze the no duty to rescue rule in light of the current theories of 
psychology on helping behavior, including why people do or do not help 
in various situations, and what social or psychological impediments must 
be overcome in order for people to be likely to rescue. 
9. !d. 
10. See Francis Bohlen, Moral Duty to Aid Others as the Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. 
REV. 217 (1908) (citing Francis Bohlen, The Basis of A.ffirnwtive Obligations in the Law of Tort, 53 
U. PA. L. REV. 209 (1905)). 
II. See generally Bender, supra note 8; Marc A. Franklin, Vermont Requires Rescue: A 
Comment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1972); Eric H. Grush, The Inefficiency of the No Duty to Rescue 
Rule and A Proposed Similar Risk Alternative, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 881 (1998); Wallace M. Rudolph, 
The Duty to Act: A Proposed Rule, 44 NEB. L. REV. 499 (1965). 
12. William Landes & Richard Posner, Salvors, Findors, Good Samaritans, and Other Res-
cuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978). 
13. See Richard L. Hasen, The Efficient Duty to Rescue, 15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 141, 147 
(1995). 
14. See infra notes 121, 124, 126, and 133. 
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II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
The Restatement Second of Torts section 314 states, "the fact that 
the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for 
another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to 
take such action."15 An important distinction between misfeasance and 
non-feasance must be recognized in order to understand the law as it 
stands. "Misfeasance differs from non-feasance in two respects; in the 
character of the conduct complained of, and second, in the nature of the 
detriment suffered in consequence thereof."16 A person will be held li-
able if their misfeasance causes or compounds the injury, but will not be 
held liable if their non-feasance resulted in greater injury. While this dif-
ference is a foundation of the no duty to rescue rule, 17 "[t]he clever law 
student is ... able to tum commissions into omissions by arguing, for 
example, that negligent driving is nothing more than the failure to 
brake." 18 Due to the lack of clarity between action and inaction, the no 
duty to rescue rule has many exceptions.19 Liability for non-feasance first 
appeared in situations where there was some special relationship between 
the parties.20 In these cases, the defendant was found to have some kind 
of duty to aid or protect the plaintiff. 
A. Exceptions to the No Duty to Rescue Rule 
Although some exceptions have been created by statute, the majority 
arose out of court decisions imposing liability in specific circumstances. 
Exceptions to the no duty to rescue rule include (1) statutes imposing an 
affirmative duty, and (2) special relationships, such as that among a 
ship's crew or between an employer and employee, a carrier and its pas-
sengers, and innkeepers and guests.21 
1. Statutes 
Various types of statutes have been adopted that impose a duty on 
one person to help another in need. The primary example are "hit and 
run" statutes, which require a driver involved in an automobile accident, 
whether or not he was at fault, to give assistance to those injured.22 When 
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 314 (1965). 
16. Bohlen, supra note 10, at 220. 
17. See Levmore, supra note 6, at 879. 
18. /d. 
19. See infra Part !I.A. 
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. C (1965). 
21. See infra Part II.A.2. 
22. See f?enerally 7A AM. JUR. 2DAutomobiles and Highway Traffic§ 354 (1997). 
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driving an automobile, a person who causes injury cannot merely walk 
away under a no duty to rescue rule. Aside from "hit and run" statutes, 
other types of statutes that impose a duty to rescue those in danger have 
been adopted as well. For example, a Vermont law states that: 
[a] person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm 
shall, to the extent that the same can be rendered without danger or 
peril to himself or without interference with important duties owed to 
others, give reasonable assistance to the ex~osed person unless that as-
sistance or care is being provided by others. 3 
The duty to rescue is limited to where the rescuer can act without 
putting herself in danger. A Minnesota statute, similar to the Vermont 
statute, imposed a duty on persons who were "at the scene of an emer-
gency."24 The Vermont statute imposes a duty on persons "who know 
that another is exposed."25 Both Rhode Island and Massachusetts enacted 
statutes imposing a more limted duty to rescue. Under Rhode Island law, 
a witness to a sexual assault must immediately notify the police. 26 The 
Massachusetts statute applies to witnesses of armed robberies and homi-
cides as well as rapes?7 
2. Case Law 
The case law exceptions to the no duty to rescue rule all arise out of 
special relationships between the victim and the rescuer. One category of 
exceptions to the no duty to rescue rule is that of the person who negli-
gently injures another. "[C]ourts have broadened [the] rule, placing the 
duty on anyone whose conduct-whether innocent or negligent-has 
/d. 
23. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973). The section continues stating: 
(b) A person who provides reasonable assistance in compliance with subsection (a) 
of this section shall not be liable in civil damages unless his acts constitute gross negli-
gence or unless he will receive or expects to receive remuneration. Nothing contained in 
this subsection shall alter existing law with respect to tort liability of a practitioner of the 
healing arts for acts committed in the ordinary course of his practice. (c) A person who 
willfully violates subsection (a) of this section shall be fined not more than $100.00. 
24. MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 604.05 (repealed 1994). 
25. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973). 
26. See Jay Silver, The Duty to Rescue: A Reexamination and Proposal, 26 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 423 (1985). 
27. See R.I. GEN. LAWS§§ 11-37-3.1-3.4 (Supp. 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
268, § 40 (West Supp. 1983). 
Actually, the Rhode Island and Massachusetts statutes are 'rescue' statutes only to 
the extent that police might be notified during the commission of a crime and might re-
spond in time to prevent or mitigate harm. Since a witness could comply with their duty 
by notifying police shortly after the commission of the crime, these statutes more closely 
resemble the common law ban against 'misprison of felony.' 
Silver, supra note 26, at 427 n. 35. 
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caused injury or unreasonable danger."28 By causing the initial injury, a 
person becomes liable for the effects of that injury. Thus a special rela-
tionship is created between the injurer and the person injured. 
Other exceptions to the no duty to rescue law have been imposed 
through the courts over time. One type of exception is where there is a 
working or quasi-partnership relationship between the rescuer and the 
victim. For example, a ship's captain and crew have a duty to rescue 
other members of the crew. In Harris v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.,29 the 
court held that the crew of a ship owes a duty to rescue one of its mem-
bers who, even by his own neglect, falls into the sea. While Harris was 
working, he fell overboard, and a fireman he had been working with 
called "man overboard." Harris was about twenty-five feet behind the 
boat, and the fireman picked up a hawser30 and threw it toward Harris, 
but it was too heavy and did not reach him.31 "No other effort was made 
to throw a line or other device to Harris while he was in the water."32 The 
Harris court stated that there was no doubt that a legal obligation rested 
upon the ship's crew to use due diligence to save another member of the 
crew who had fallen into the sea.33 As the court states, a person is "com-
pletely dependent for care and safety upon such succor as may be given 
by the members of the crew."34 The court noted the ease with which a 
life buoy or other item could have been thrown to save Harris. However, 
the court affirmed that the exception to the no duty to rescue rule did not 
come from the ease of rescue, but from the relationship between the ship 
and its crew?5 
Another exception to the general rule is that an employer has a duty 
to her employee where in the course of that employment the employee 
suffers injury. In Carey v. Davis,36 an employee, who was excavating a 
gravel pit, became overheated. The employee fainted, regained con-
sciousness, resumed working and fainted again. His co-workers put him 
into a wagon out in the sun and left him there for about four hours, caus-
ing his condition to worsen. The court stated the general rule, that there 
is no legal duty "in the absence of any agreement or contract" to care for 
28. Silver, supra note 26, at 426 (citing W. Prosser & W. Keeton, THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, 
at 375 (5°' ed. 1984). 
29. 50 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1931). 
30. A hawser is a heavy cable or rope used in mooring or towing a ship. See id. 
31. See id. 
32. /d. at 867. There was a life buoy kept near the pilot house which White, the first mate, 
could have reached within three to four seconds. He made no attempt to do so, and after not seeing 
Harris, walked back into the pilot house after a couple of minutes. /d. 
33. See id. at 868. 
34. /d. 
35. See id. 
36. 180 N.W. 889 (Iowa 1921). 
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a sick or injured servant,37 but then went on to hold: 
Where in the course of his employment a servant suffers serious injury 
or is suddenly stricken down in a manner indicating the immediate and 
emergent need of aid to save him from death or serious harm, the mas-
ter, if present, is in duty bound to take such reasonable measures or 
make such reasonable effort as may be practicable to relieve him, even 
though such master be not chargeable with fault in bringing about the 
38 
emergency. 
Thus, a duty was imposed on employers because of their special relation-
ship to the injured or suffering employee. 
Another exception to the general rule is that a carrier has a duty to its 
passengers. In Middleton v. Whiteridge,39 the New York Court of Ap-
peals held that a duty springs from "the contract to carry safely."40 In this 
case a man was riding a streetcar and experienced a cerebral hemorrhage. 
The man rode for some time, and seemed okay to the conductor at first. 
Later, the conductor noticed there was something wrong with the man. 
He was vomiting, and according to the conductor, he looked intoxicated 
and sick to his stomach.41 The man died and medical evidence showed 
that if the deceased had received proper care within one or two hours af-
ter the cerebral hemorrhage happened, he would have likely recovered. 
The court held, "if a passenger becomes sick and unable to care for him-
self during his journey ... the carrier owes him an added duty resulting 
from the change of situation."42 Thus, those whose work is in transport-
ing others have been held to have a duty to the passengers.43 
Other relationships have also been held to impose a special duty to 
rescue despite non-involvement in the situation. This includes an inn-
keeper and his guests, such that "[a]n innkeeper is obliged, in the exer-
cise of reasonable care, to protect his guests against assaults from any 
one, including his employees." 44 Additionally, a police officer who has 
37. See id. at 890. 
38. /d. 
39. 108N.E.I92(N.Y.1915). 
40. /d. at 197. 
41. See id. 
42. /d. 
43. See id. at 197. The court also noted, "the carrier is not bound, unless it has notice of the 
fact, to observe that its passenger is ill." But if the crew knew or "had notice of the facts ... it was 
their duty to give him such reasonable attention as the circumstances ... permitted." /d. 
44. Dove v. Lowden, 47 F. Supp. 546, 548 (W.O. Miss. 1942). In this case the plaintiff was a 
guest when he went into the hotel lunchroom for refreshments. According to the court, "[w]hile that 
relation existed it is the law that the trustees owed the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect him 
against injuries from assault, or otherwise, whether committed by employees or other guests. An 
innkeeper is obliged, in the exercise of reasonable care, to protect his guests against assaults from 
any one, including his employees." /d. In this particular case those accused of the abuse were not on 
duty and not acting within the scope of their employment. Additionally, it appears that the injuries 
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taken a person into custody owes a duty of care to that person.45 This 
duty is to exercise ordinary care to keep the prisoner safe and free from 
harm generally.46 This includes protecting prisoners from harming them-
selves or from being harmed by others.47 While the courts of the United 
States have held to the general rule that there is no duty to rescue, they 
have also seen the need for extensive exceptions to that rule.48 
B. The International Rule on Duty to Rescue 
Many other countries around the world imposes a duty to rescue. In 
Europe, the duty is widespread.49 The French Penal Code provides that: 
[A]ny person who willfully fails to render or to obtain assistance to an 
endangered person when such was possible without danger to himself 
or others, shall be subject to [imprisonment] for no less than three 
months nor more than five years, a fine from 36,000 to 1 ,500,000 
francs, or both. 50 
This rule is substantially harsher than the laws in Vermont and Minne-
sota, where the maximum stay in prison is one year. Germany enacted a 
statute in 1935 which states: 
Whosoever, in case of accident or common danger, or necessity, does 
not render assistance, even though this is his duty according to sound 
popular sentiment and, in particular, does not comply with the request 
for assistance of a police agent, even though he could comply with the 
request without serious danger and without the infringement of other 
occurred off the premises of the defendant, and therefore the defendant innkeeper was not held liable 
for the injuries to the plaintiff, despite the general duty to rescue. See also Lehnen v. E. J. Hines & 
Co., 127 P. 612 (Ill. 1912). 
45. See Thomas v. Williams, 124 S.E.2d 409 (1962).In this case a police officer arrested and 
incarcerated a drunk prisoner. The prisoner had a lighted cigarette and matches on him. The officer 
knew the condition of the prisoner and left him unattended in the cell. The mattress in the cell, upon 
which the prisoner was lying, caught fire and the whole area filled with smoke. When the officer 
came back in he did not remove the prisoner, but doused the cell and mattress with water, which 
increased the amount of smoke. The prisoner died of exposure to fire and smoke. "This case estab-
lishes the standard of care owed by a law enforcement officer to a prisoner placed in his care and 
custody - to keep the prisoner safe and free from harm, to render him medical aid when nece~sary, 
and to treat him humanely and refrain from oppressing him. Georgia is in accord with the majority of 
courts in imposing this standard of care." /d. at 413 (citing Anno. 14 A.L.R.2d 354 (1950)). 
46. See id. 
47. See id. 
48. See supra notes 29, 36, 44, and 45. Each of these cases represents an exception to the 
general no duty to rescue rule. 
49. See Thomas, 124 S.E.2d at 434. 
50. /d. (quoting THE FRENCH PENAL CODE, in I The American Series of Foreign Penal 
Codes (G. Mueller ed. 1960)). 
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important duties, is punishable with prison for up to two years or with a 
fine. 51 
All of the Eastern European codes except Albania have similar stat-
d. 52 "In L . A . I utes regar mg rescue. atm menca, a most every country ... 
provides in its penal code for the punishment of bad samaritans."53 
It is clear that a large portion of the countries of the world has im-
posed some sort of duty to rescue. That duty is generally triggered by: (1) 
awareness of someone in danger; (2) the ability for the potential rescuer 
to help without putting himself or others in danger; (3) some sort of rela-
tionship between the victim and rescuer; and (4) the amount of "help" 
required of the rescuer. 
Ill. A Law and Economics Approach 
Scholars have taken various approaches to analyzing the no duty to 
rescue rule. Economical efficiency is one argument supporting this rule. 54 
In order to illustrate this, William Landes and Richard Posner present a 
scenario in which a person is presented with a choice between two activi-
ties, A and B, each having equal entertainment value. However, each of 
these activities has a different magnitude of risk. If liability for non-
rescue is imposed, those who could be potential rescuers will choose the 
safer activity in order to avoid the potential liability involved with the 
riskier activity. By doing so they have reduced the number of potential 
rescuers in activity A because of the greater costs associated with the po-
tential liability created by an affirmative duty to rescue. As the rule cur-
rently stands, there is no affirmative duty to rescue and therefore, accord-
ing to Landes and Posner, a potential rescuer will not avoid the more 
dangerous activity because the potential cost of liability is no greater 
than the potential cost of liability for a safe activity.55 Assume activity A 
is swimming at the beach, and activity B is playing racquetball. Person X 
enjoys both swimming and racquetball and is an excellent swimmer. If 
liability were imposed based on an affirmative duty to rescue, X would 
be more likely to avoid swimming, because X will be required to rescue 
51. Alberto Cadoppi, Failure to Rescue and the Continental Criminal Law, in THE DUTY TO 
RESCUE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AID 93, 101 (Michael A. Menlowe & Alexander McCall Smith 
eds., 1993) (citing Para. 330c. StGB). The author reflects on the idea that the above cited statute 
came from the Nazi regime. At the time, the previous weaker rule had been "strongly criticized and 
considered the typical product of an individualistic and liberal society." /d. at 101. Since that time, 
the statute has been amended and contains no references to the "sound popular sentiment." /d. at 
101-102. 
52. See id. at I 04. 
53. /d. 
54. See generally Landes, supra note 12. 
55. See id. 
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if there is an emergency. If those who are good swimmers avoid the ac-
tivity because it is a dangerous activity, and an affirmative duty to rescue 
increases the costs associated with that activity, there will be fewer po-
tential rescuers participating in those activities. In the alternative, as long 
as there is no legal duty, then the costs associated with swimming are not 
any greater and people will continue to swim, and people will continue to 
rescue out of altruistic motives.56 According to Landes and Posner, the 
rule as it stands is more efficient in that if an affirmative duty were im-
posed, potential rescuers would be likely to avoid risky activities because 
of the higher cost associated with them, and the overall amount of rescu-
ing would go down.57 Landes and Posner similarly argue that imposing a 
duty to rescue might decrease the number of people who rescue out of 
altruism, because such people may be viewed as having acted only to 
avoid the penalty.58 
Furthermore, the question asks how far the imposition of an affirma-
tive duty to help may go. "Even if the rule starts out with such modest 
ambitions, it is difficult to confine it to those limits."59 What is the limit 
on how much help a person must give in order to help another? 
Take a simple case first. X as a representative of a private charity asks 
you for $1 0 in order to save the life of some starving child in a country 
ravaged by war. There are other donors available but the number of 
needy children exceeds that number. The money means "nothing" to 
you. Are you under a legal obligation to give the $10? Or lend it inter-
est-free? Does $10 amount to a substantial cost or inconvenience ... ?60 
While this deals with a charitable contribution as opposed to some 
physical form of help, it is easy to see that the line between the two, if 
there is one, is thin indeed. How far must a person go in order to help 
someone? If a person sees another driving, and it sounds like their brakes 
are about to give out, are they obligated to take some affirmative action 
and warn or help the person with the squeaky brakes? "In each case, it 
will be possible for some judge or jury to decide that there was some-
thing else which the defendant should have done .... "61 
Additionally, there are a number of problems with imposing a legal 
duty to rescue. The first question involves who should be made liable. In 
56. See id. 
57. See id. The authors admit that they have not proved that imposing liability for failure to 
rescue would not be as efficient: "[w]e have merely suggested that the results under the common 
law, occasionally imposing liability but mostly denying it, may be consistent with efficiency." Td. at 
126. 
58. See id. 
59. Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 198 (1973). 
60. !d. at 198-99. 
61. /d. at 199. 
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many situations there are many people around who could possibly help. 
Is it proper to impose liability on all of them? What if rescue is easy for 
some and more difficult for others? What if there is a large strong person 
who is a good swimmer who could easily rescue a victim, and on the 
other hand a small weak person who does not know how to swim? If they 
are both sitting on the dock when a victim is drowning are they equally 
obligated to rescue? Those in favor of imposing liability suggest these 
cases be treated similarly to joint and several liability, similar to the 
situation in which two hunters negligently shoot and one unintentionally 
hits the third person.62 However, the problem with this is that each per-
son may have heard a distant call for help and believed someone else is 
there to help. The number of excuses for not helping may be large. 
Establishing causation in a case such as this would be nearly impossible. 
Some people suggest rescue should only be required if it is easy to 
do and will not put the rescuer's life in peril. The problem with this idea 
is that in an emergency a potential rescuer must then evaluate any situa-
tion and determine whether or not they might be put in danger by help-
ing. This seems to be a very gray area in which it would be difficult to 
determine liability. Should the person have reached in to save the drown-
ing swimmer, or might she have been pulled in by the swimmer and been 
placed in danger herself? In such a variety of situations it could be very 
problematic for the courts to impose a general rule. On the other hand, 
courts are often called upon to make these types of difficult decisions. 
The rule encourages people to take steps to avoid dangers. Knowing 
there is no legal duty to help, or be helped, people are more likely to take 
care of themselves.63 If there were some duty to help, it is possible that 
people would be less concerned about potential hazards because they 
know that as long as someone is around, they are required to help. Those 
who support the no duty to rescue rule see it as being an efficient rule64 
which encourages self-reliance65 and only makes a person responsible for 
the harm she caused through her actions, as opposed to harm she could 
have prevented by acting. 
On the other hand, scholars have also posed economic arguments as 
to why imposing a duty to rescue would be more efficient.66 Rather than 
looking at potential rescuers and victims as different classes of people as 
has been done previously,67 some have suggested that those who are po-
62. See Levmore, supra note 6, at 934 n. 180 (citing Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d I (1948)). 
63. See Epstein, supra note 59, at 203. 
64. See generally Landes, supra note 12. 
65. See Epstein, supra note 59 at 203. 
66. See Grush, supra note II, at 881. 
67. This is the view that has been posed in the Landes & Posner argument. They argue that 
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tential rescuers are also potential victims.68 People are not necessarily 
more likely to avoid an activity that is dangerous because they will be 
called upon to be a rescuer. While imposing liability may increase the 
costs associated with a particular activity for a potential rescuer, the costs 
of participating in that activity are at the same time diminished because 
the person weighing the alternatives would also know that they will 
likely be rescued in the event that something unfortunate befalls them. In 
response to the argument that the high cost associated with saving will 
drive a person away, others have suggested that there are transaction 
costs associated with changing a particular activity, and those costs may 
outweigh the costs associated with imposing liability. 
IV. A MORAL/PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH 
Scholars have also taken a philosophical approach as to whether the 
no duty to rescue rule is appropriate. Much of the argument regarding the 
imposition of a duty to rescue is based on ethical considerations. John 
Stuart Mill suggested that "the only purpose for which power can right-
fully be exercised over any member of a civilized community against his 
will is to prevent harm to others."69 He further went on to clarify this as-
sertion by saying, "His own good either physical or moral is not a suffi-
cient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because 
it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, be-
cause in the opinions of others to do so would be wise or even right."70 
According to this statement we should not be coerced by government 
into helping others. The United States Constitution suggests part of its 
purpose is to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Pos-
. "71 tenty. 
Therefore, is it proper to impose a moral duty to help others through 
a legal obligation? 
On the one hand, one may argue that the function of law is to promote 
the common good or the greatest happiness of the greatest number. On 
victims and potential rescuers are non-overlapping groups, assuming that people are either inherently 
rescuers or inherently victims. See Landes, supra note 12, at 120 n. 95. 
68. See Grush, supra note II, at 881. 
69. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LiBERTY 30 (1859). 
70. !d. 
71. U.S. CONST. Preamble. Elaborating on the idea that one should not be coerced into 
helping others, one commentator suggests: 
Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society 
as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss of freedom for 
some is made right by a greater good shared by others. It does not allow that the sacri-
fices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many. 
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3-4 (1971 ). 
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the other, it may be argued that, when moral opinions differ, a tolerant 
society should use law to enforce the moral convictions of some only 
72 
when absolutely necessary. 
Is this an area that should remain as a moral duty as opposed to a le-
gal duty? Michael Godwin suggests that "man's moral development re-
quires the law's abstention from interference in private judgment ... " 73 
Thus, in order to have sufficient moral development of citizens, citizens 
must be allowed to act and make decisions for themselves rather than 
having their morality legislated. By not making moral decisions for 
themselves, people may never become intrinsically moral. Their actions 
may be based merely on what the law requires them to do. 
On the other hand, the law requires moral choices to be made all the 
time, i.e. murder, theft, etc. In fact, critics of Mills suggest that because 
we are all a part of society, nobody knows the types of harm we cause to 
others through our actions.74 Furthermore, in order to have liberty, there 
must be structure: "[l]ike a building, every society has a structure that, by 
constraining the actions of its members, permits them at the same time to 
act to accomplish their ends. Without any structure, chaos would reign 
and the current population could not be sustained."75 
A major reason for imposing a duty to rescue is that it is the moral 
thing to do.76 "In defining duty, what matters is that someone, a human 
being, a part of us, is drowning and will die without [imposing] some af-
firmative duty."77 Furthermore, "the drowning stranger is not the only 
person affected by the lack of care."78 As part of a community, we should 
not just stand by and watch another person in danger of death or major 
injury without being affected ourselves.79 People cannot simply refrain 
72. Michael A. Menlowe, The Philosophical Foundations of a Duty to Rescue, in THE DUTY 
TO RESCUE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AID 93 (Michael A. Menlowe & Alexander McCall Smith eds., 
1993). 
73. Weinrib, supra note 57, at 265 (commenting on I W. GODWIN, ENQUIRIY CONCERNING 
POLITICAL JUSTICE AND ITS INFLUENCE ON GENERAL VIRTUE AND HAPPINESS 165 (I. Kramnick ed. 
1976)). 
74. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LiBERTY AND MORALITY 5 (1963). 
75. 2 RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 2 
(1998). 
76. See generally Menlowe, supra note 72 (commenting on HENRY SIDGWICK, THE 
METHODS OF ETHICS Book IV, Ch 3 (London, 7u. ed., 1922). Menlowe notes: 
It is evident, he thinks, that the greatest happiness of the greatest number is produced by 
imposing a duty to rescue in certain circumstances. So an exception is required to the 
general principle that the greatest happiness of the greatest number is produced by allow-
ing individuals freely to contract their services. But the exception is itself justified on 
utilitarian grounds because it maximizes happiness without undesirable side-effects. 
!d. at 23. 
77. Bender, supra note 8, at 34. 
78. /d. 
79. See id. 
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from making a choice to help. In that non-action, the person has made a 
decision not to help and to allow another to continue suffering. One au-
thor sees humanity as more important than other concerns and suggests 
"a strong legal value [be] placed on care and concern for others rather 
than on economic efficiency or individualliberty."80 
What assumptions must be made and accepted to say that this is not a 
plausible argument? Do we naturally assume that individualism is better 
than a shared existence, and that economic efficiency is the most impor-
tant goal of society? Perhaps we should be looking at the question in 
more humanistic terms and see our duty to each other as people as more 
important than a goal of economic efficiency. According to Bender, do-
ing so would "transform the core of negligence law to a human response 
,81 
system. 
Upon establishing a moral duty to rescue, it is necessary to ask 
whether that moral obligation should be transformed into a legal obliga-
tion. Those who do not think there should be an obligation say it would 
interfere with liberty and altruistic actions.82 However, it can also be ar-
gued that the laws we set up for ourselves in tum give us a moral guide-
post. Our moral values are often shaped by the laws which govern the 
society of which we are a part.83 
Law not only reflects society's moral values, but also helps shape them. 
As one commentator asserts, 'Legal and moral rules are in symbiotic 
relation; one learns what is moral by observing what other people ... 
tend to enforce.' Accordingly, a legal duty to rescue would increase the 
number of persons who feel morally compelled to offer emergency aid. 
This, in turn, would increase the likelihood that people would render 
assistance in situations in which the failure to do so would go unde-
tected.84 
The existence of a legal duty would encourage rescue in four subtly 
different ways: 1) some people would act out of a desire to be law abid-
ing, 2) others would act out of fear of legal sanctions, particularly when 
witnesses were present, 3) some who are timid would be provided with 
the necessary motivation to intervene, and 4) others would be moved into 
action by a heightened sense of the morality of rescue. 
Instead of the law impairing moral development, as has been previ-
ously suggested,85 the law is likely to guide and improve moral sense.86 
80. !d. 
81. !d. 
82. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
83. See Silver, supra note 26, at 428-29. 
84. !d. 
85. See id. 
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One study analyzed the correlation between the law and the specific so-
ciety's attitudes.87 The study found that "the existence of a legal duty ... 
correlated with the respondents' view of how the law should treat people 
who do not help in low-risk situations."88 The number of people who 
thought that nothing should be done was lowest in countries where there 
was a legal obligation to help, and highest in countries where there was 
no legal obligation to help. Furthermore, "jail sentences for violators 
were preferred by 22 percent in Germany, 15 percent in Austria, and 2 
percent in the United States."89 This seems to show that people's moral 
values were correlated with the law in their country. In countries where a 
legal duty had been imposed, people felt like there was a stronger obliga-
tion to help, and more people felt like the person who failed to help 
should be punished.90 These arguments suggest a moral obligation can 
and should be imposed legally. Doing so would increase people's aware-
ness of the need to help others, and also likely adjust their attitudes to the 
idea that we have a duty to help others we see in trouble. 
As was stated earlier, a main reason why some people suggest a legal 
duty to rescue should be imposed is based on the idea that "lives would 
be saved and injuries avoided."91 As the law stands, the United States is a 
society in which it is legally acceptable to stand by and watch another in 
distress without doing anything to help. Those who would not impose li-
ability suggest it is not the province of the law to force people to act 
morally. Those who would have liability imposed argue that the law 
would be an effective tool to encourage rescue. 92 
86. See Silver, supra note 26, at 428-29 (quoting Anthony D' Amato, The "Bad Samaritan" 
Paradigm, 70 Nw. U. L. REV. 798, 809 (1975)). 
87. See Franklin, supra note II, at 59 (citing Zeisel, An International Experiment on the Ef-




90. See id. 
91. D' Amato, supra note 86, at 809: 
[Other] [s]tudies support the existence of this relationship. In one, a group was given a 
number of fact situations, such as that of a bystander who watched idly as a man drowned 
10 feet from shore. They were told that an attempt to rescue was required by law. An-
other group was given identical facts, except that an attempt to rescue was not required. 
A greater proportion of the first group felt that the actions of the passive observer were 
morally wrong. The existence of a legal duty apparently helped the subjects define the 
failure to rescue as immoral 
!d. (cited in Silver, supra note 26, at 429 n. 43). 
92. See id. 
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V. A PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 
While moral/philosophical, and economic efficiency paradigms have 
been used to support or refute the need for imposing liability on the per-
son who fails to rescue another in need, none of these have explained 
why people do or do not help in certain situations. The economic models 
suggest that everything is done in terms of what will offer the highest 
utility while keeping costs at a minimum.93 These models, however, of-
ten fail in their attempt to capture the human experience. Are all deci-
sions people make based on their estimation of a cost benefit analysis? 
Are even a significant part of the decisions people make based on a cost 
benefit analysis? Psychologists have shown that people often take cogni-
tive shortcuts labeled heuristics, in order to process the vast amount of 
information that is constantly taken in.94 This being the case, it is diffi-
cult to suppose that in emergency situations, people are likely to take 
time to make a cost benefit analysis before deciding whether or not to 
help another in need. The field of psychology is based around under-
standing how and why people act the way they do. Social psychology is 
aimed at understanding the effect on a person's behavior of both person-
ality and situational influences. As part of this study several theories 
have arisen as to why people do or do not help in certain situations, and 
these can give insight into why the no duty to rescue rule is fashioned as 
it is. 
A. Self-Interested Help 
Much of the theoretical basis for psychological research assumes that 
people are generally self-interested.95 In an address to the American Psy-
chological Association, David Campbell stated, "Psychology and psy-
chiatry ... not only describe man as selfishly motivated, but implicitly or 
explicitly teach that he ought to be so."96 William James, a founding fa-
ther of American psychology, expressed a similar view. He stated, "Each 
mind, to begin with, must have a certain minimum of selfishness in the 
shape of instincts of bodily self-seeking in order to exist. This minimum 
must be there as a basis for all further conscious acts, whether of self-
93. See generally Landes, supra note 12. 
94. See A. Tversky & D. Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 
185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974). 
95. See David T. Campbell, On the Conflicts Between Biological and Social Evolution and 
Between Psychology and Moral Tradition. 30 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1103, 1104 (1975). 
96. /d. 
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negation or of a selfishness more subtle still .... "97 A major answer to 
the question of why people help others is that they do so for egoistic con-
cerns. Some of the egoistic concerns may include material or social re-
wards; another motivation may be to reduce the aversive feelings associ-
ated with seeing someone else in distress.98 
One group of researchers suggested people will be more likely to 
help when they feel bad because helping is a way for people to make 
themselves feel better.99 Those theories which focus on reduction of 
negative feelings associated with seeing others in distress suggest that 
often the easiest way to get rid of those feelings is to run away from the 
situation rather than help. Thus, rather than a deep seated moral need to 
help others, perhaps much of the helping behavior we do or do not see is 
based on selfish concerns. If it is rewarding enough to help, or aversive 
enough not to help, people will be more likely to do it. Accepting this 
premise, the law as it stands would not be most effective. Imposing a 
general duty to help would be more effective at encouraging helping be-
havior because people would be motivated to help by the desire to avoid 
the negative consequences of not helping. As will be discussed below, 
some psychologists have suggested alternative theories of motivation for 
helping behavior. 
B. Empathy-Altruism 
In contrast to the idea that all behavior, including that of helping, is 
based on selfish motives, Daniel Batson suggests that many helpful ac-
tions performed by people may be motivated by altruism, which is the 
desire to increase another's welfare. 100 According to Batson's Empathy-
Altruism hypothesis, if a person feels empathy for another person in 
need, they are more likely to help that person than if they do not feel em-
pathy .101 In this model, the first step is for a person to perceive that an-
other person needs help. 102 Once a person sees that help is needed, the 
second step is whether that person adopts the other person's perspec-
tive.103 If they do, they will have empathic concern, but if they do not, 
97. WILLIAM JAMES. PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 115 (1890). 
98. See Sagi & Hoffman, Empathic Distress in Newborns, 25 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 
254 (1976). 
99. See Robert Cialdini et al., Transgression and Altruism: A Case for Hedonism, 9 J. OF 
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 502 (1973). This was called Mood Enhancement. This study rein-
forced the idea that people were more likely to offer help, or volunteer for a project, after thinking 
they had accidentally harmed someone. 
I 00. See C. DANIEL BATSON, THE ALTRUISM QUESTION 6 (1991). 
101. Seeid.at74. 
102. See id. at 76. 
103. See id. 
271] THE NO DUTY TO RESCUE RULE 287 
they will experience personal distress. 104 Concern leads to an altruistic 
motivation with the goal of reducing the other person's distress. 105 Lack 
of concern leads to an egoistic motivation and a desire to reduce a per-
son's own distress. 106 One study predicted and found that those high in 
empathy would be likely to help even when they had a chance to easily 
escape the situation. 107 Alternately, those who did not feel empathy for 
the victim helped in order to reduce their own aversive feelings, but if 
there was an easy chance to escape without helping, they were more 
likely to take it. 108 
Legal scholars have suggested that altruistic rescue may decrease if 
liability is imposed for failing to rescue because then rescuers will be 
perceived as less altruistic, and their motives will be based around poten-
tial compensation from rescuing another. 109 According to psychological 
theorists, this motive for rescuing would be considered an egoistic con-
cern as opposed to an altruistic concern. If empathy is the primary expla-
nation for why people help others, then it is unlikely that imposing a duty 
to rescue others in need would change the amount of help that is gener-
ally given. 110 However, if there is more than one explanation or motiva-
tion behind why people help, then viewing some helping behavior as 
egoistic and some as altruistic is appropriate. Based on these two expla-
nations, imposing a duty to rescue would likely increase the number of 
rescues because those who rescue for altruistic purposes will not de-
crease, and the number of those who help for egoistic purposes will in-
crease. 
104. See id. 
105. See id. 
I 06. See id. While much of this seems to be common sense, it goes against many of the theo-
retical foundations of psychology which have previously been noted. In order to test this idea the 
researchers lead a subject into a room, told them they would be working with another person, and let 
them read an information sheet. The sheet informed subjects that one subject would perform a task 
while the other would observe, and that the parts would be assigned randomly. The other "subject" 
who is actually a confederate working with the researchers, arrives and is chosen as the person to be 
shocked. She is hooked up and receives some shocks, she looks extremely uncomfortable, and as she 
asks for a glass of water she tells the researcher that she had a bad experience with an electric fence 
as a child. But she says she will continue the experiment. The researcher then asks if the subject will 
take the confederate's place. Empathy was measured by self-reports. As predicted, those higher in 
empathy took on the shock. Even when the researchers provided a way for the subject to leave, they 
took on the shocks when they felt empathy for the confederate. /d. 
107. See id. 
108. See id. 
109. See generally Landes, supra note 12. 
110. See BATSON, supra note 100, at 51. 
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C. Factors Which Predict Helping 
Besides internal motivation, there are other factors that have been 
shown to reliably predict helping. These factors include similarity, close-
ness, and belief in a just world. 111 Research has indicated that we are 
more likely to help those who are similar to us. 112 A sociobiological ex-
planation for this is that we are genetically predisposed to help our spe-
cies continue, and those who look more similar to us are more likely to 
be genetically similar to us. 113 Similarly, the law reflects this bias to-
wards those who are our offspring by imposing a duty on parents to res-
cue their children. 114 
Additionally, people are more helpful to others they know and care 
about than they are to total strangers or merely superficial acquaintan-
ces.115 This research is useful in understanding the exceptions to the gen-
eral rule of no duty to rescue. The major exception to the rule is when 
there is some sort of special relationship. Parents have a duty to their 
children, and spouses have a duty to each other. 116 One explanation as to 
why this particular duty has been implemented at common law is that 
there is a closeness in these relationships, and it is expected when people 
have a close relationship they will help one another. 
A final factor that predicts whether or not a person is likely to help is 
a belief in a just world. 117 This belief rests on the assumption that people 
get what they merit. People who are good and do good things will be 
blessed, and those who do not, and are bad, will suffer. 118 This belief 
leads people to attribute bad characteristics to those who are suffering 
and this may justify a person who does not help someone they perceive 
to be suffering. 119 In this way, the usual distress involved in seeing an-
Ill. See J. F. Dovidio, Helping Behavior and Altruism: An Empirical and Conceptual Over-
view, in 17 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 404-409 (L. Berkowitz ed., 1984). 
112. See BATSON supra note 100, at 51. 
113. See id. (citing D. Krebs, The Challenge of Altruism in Biology and Psychology, in 
SOCIOBIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY: IDEAS, ISSUES, AND APPLICATIONS 81 (C. Crawford et al. eds., 
1987)). 
114. See Silver, supra note 26, at 425. 
115. See Matthew Clark, Recipient's Mood, Relationship Type, and Helping, 53 J. 
PERSONALITY AND Soc. PSYCHOL. 94 ( 1987). 
116. See Silver, supra note 26, at 425 
117. See generally MELVIN J. LERNER, THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD: A FuNDAMENTAL 
DELUSION ( 1980). 
118. See id. 
119. See id. 
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other person suffer is lessened. 120 By understanding this general belief, it 
is easier to understand why certain people are not likely to help another 
in need. Imposing a general rule requiring people to help goes against 
some people's assumptions about the world. 
D. The Problem With Bystander Intervention 
A final theory for understanding what inhibits people from helping in 
certain circumstances is the bystander effect. 121 According to researchers, 
there are basic social norms which promote helping victims, however 
there are also fears which block people from helping. Some of these fears 
include, "fears of physical harm, public embarrassment, involvement 
with police procedures, lost work days and jobs, and other potential dan-
gers."122 While logically it would seem that the more people there are 
around when you are in need, the more likely you are to receive help, this 
is not the case. One study simulated a person having a seizure. When 
people thought they were alone, they were likely to help 85% of the time. 
Those who thought there were others around only provided help 31% of 
the time. 123 From this and further research, Bib Latane and John Darley, 
two social psychologists, were able to point out a series of steps or hur-
dles a person must go past in order to make the decision to help. 124 These 
hurdles can be used to understand why people do not help at times, and 
in tum why the law has not imposed a general duty to rescue. 
1. Noticing 
The first step is noticing. 125 A person must notice that someone needs 
help, or that something unusual is happening. One of the biggest barriers 
against noticing a situation is being in a hurry. People who are pressed 
for time are not as likely to notice a problem. The likelihood a person 
will notice a problem is also a factor of the size of the community a per-
son is in. People in larger cities are less likely to help than those who live 
in smaller, rural communities. 126 For example, in a small community, 
seeing a person lying on the sidewalk may immediately signal the need 
120. See id. 
121. See John M. Darley & Bibb Latane, Bystander Intervention In Emergencies: Diffusion of 
Responsibility, 8 1. PERSONALITY AND Soc. PSYCHOL. 377 (1968). 
122. /d. 
123. See id. 
124. See BIBB LATANE & JOHN M. DARLEY, THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER: WHY DOESN'T 
HE HELP? 31 ( 1970). 
125. See id. 
126. See N. M. Steblay, Helping Behavior in Rural and Urban Environments: A Meta-
Analysis, 102 PSYCHOL. BULL. 346 (1987). 
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for rescue, whereas in a large city, it may be more common. This obsta-
cle could be used to show that a duty to rescue should not be imposed 
because it would be difficult to prove whether a person actually noticed 
the emergency or not. However, imposing a legal duty may also have the 
effect of requiring people to be more aware of their surroundings and 
possible emergencies. This would have the effect of reducing generally 
the obstacle of failure to notice. 
2. Interpreting 
A second hurdle that must be crossed is interpreting the event as an 
121 Wh . . h . emergency. en we come upon a SituatiOn w ere 1t appears someone 
is in trouble, but no one else has done anything to help, we often look to 
others to determine how we should behave. This is called social valida-
tion, which suggests that we look to others for cues on how to act when 
we are in an unfamiliar situation or setting.128 In the case above where a 
person has come upon a situation which appears to be an emergency, if 
others are not doing anything, it is likely that the newcomer will also do 
nothing. This comes from the fear of embarrassment that may result for 
having misunderstood the situation and rushing in where help was not 
really needed. 
Furthermore, a phenomenon called pluralistic ignorance occurs when 
everyone present in a situation assumes there is no emergency because 
nobody is acting like there is an emergency.129 This happens not only in 
emergency situations, but can also happen in the classroom. People may 
be afraid to ask a question for fear of looking stupid. Then, when the 
question is not asked, it is possible that nobody understands. 
If a duty to rescue were to be legally imposed then the costs associ-
ated with liability for not helping would likely be higher than the social 
costs of looking foolish upon trying to help at the wrong time. If people 
knew the law requires them to rescue, then they may be primed and 
ready to interpret the situation as an emergency and overcome this obsta-
cle. The costs associated with liability would be greater than those asso-
ciated with the social embarrassment of attempting to help when none 
was needed. If the social norm is to take action and immediately aid an-
127. See LATANE, supra note 124, at 31-32. In a similar type of study, researchers place sub-
jects into a room either alone, or with two other non-reacting confederates to perform a task. During 
their task, smoke began filling the room. Those who were in the room alone reported the smoke sev-
enty-five percent of the time. Those who were in the room with the non-reacting confederates only 
reported the smoke ten percent of the time. Bibb Latane & John M. Darley, Group Inhibition of By-
stander Intervention in Emergencies, 10 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 215 (1968). 
128. See id. 
129. See D.T. Miller & C. McFarland, Pluralistic Ignorance: When Similarity is Interpreted as 
Dissimilarity, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 298 (1987). 
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other in distress, it seems that imposing a legal duty would also help 
overcome this second obstacle. 
3. Taking Responsibility 
The third hurdle a person must overcome when deciding to help is 
taking responsibility .130 Even if a person notices and recognizes the 
emergency, they must still take responsibility before they will act. 131 This 
is less likely to happen if others are around. 132 When others are around 
people tend to assume that someone else will do something to help the 
victim. Again, contrary to what would seem logical, the larger the num-
ber of bystanders the less likely people are to help. 133 In large groups 
people tend to feel less responsible. According to this theory of reduced 
responsibility, "when diffusion occurs, an individual recognizes and con-
tinues to believe that help is needed and should be given but also be-
lieves that this help will be given by other bystanders."134 The presence 
of others allows the person, who has seen an emergency, to assume that 
others will take care of the emergency. When it is assumed that someone 
else has or will take care of the problem it is both unnecessary, and might 
even seem foolish to step in and do something more. 
This common thought process would be altered by imposing a duty 
to rescue. If people know they are going to be held accountable for notic-
ing a situation and not helping, there is a higher probability they will act. 
However, the reverse may be true as well. Despite the knowledge that 
they could be held liable, people may assume that someone else will take 
care of the emergency and therefore they will not be held liable, and they 
will not have had to extend any effort to help. Therefore, the mere impo-
sition of liability may not help overcome this hurdle. 
4. Deciding how to provide help 
The fourth hurdle is deciding how to best provide the needed help. 135 
Often people are not trained to provide medical assistance in the case of 
a car accident. There may be a fear of causing more harm than has al-
ready been done, and/or looking foolish when trying to help. 136 If others 
130. See Darley, supra note 121, at 31. 
131. See id. 
132. See Darley, supra note 121, at 377. 
133. See Leonard Sickman, Social Influence and Diffusion of Responsibility in an Emergency, 
8 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL., 438 (1972). 
134. See id. at 445. 
135. LATANE, supra note 124. 
136. See Frederick M. Siem & Janet T. Spence, Gender-Related Traits and Helping Behav-
iors, 51 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 615 (1986). This research seemed to indicate that with 
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are around, a potential rescuer may feel afraid to perform in front of 
them, especially if she is not confident in her ability to help. She may 
feel that somebody else on hand would perform better in this situation. 
This is another hurdle which would not be overcome by imposing liabil-
ity. If a person feels like they do not know how to help, the increased 
stress of potential criminal or civil liability could either inhibit their per-
formance, or motivate them to escape the situation without helping. 137 In 
this case, imposing liability could potentially decrease rescue. 
As has been presented there are various psychological hurdles that 
can stop a person from helping another in need. A person must notice the 
emergency situation and interpret it as such, she must take responsibility 
to do something, decide how to help, and then actually perform the help. 
In the cases where the court made exception to the no duty to rescue rule, 
the scenario was such that these previously mentioned factors were not 
as prevalent. 138 These cases involve some kind of relationship between 
the potential rescuer and victim, or a situation in which the rescuer 
should know that the victim is in danger. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Taking a psychological perspective on the no duty to rescue rule 
gives a dual perspective. On the one hand, the law as it stands reflects the 
unwillingness of lawmakers to impose a general duty to rescue, and re-
flects the difficulty in understanding why in any one instance a person 
fails to help. Rather than being individualistic and morally vacant, the 
law may reflect the psychological impediments that inhibit rescue. The 
psychological phenomenon of bystander intervention seems to show, 
[T]hat a victim may be more likely to get help, or an emergency may be 
more likely to be reported, the fewer people there are available to take 
action. It also may help us begin to understand a number of frightening 
incidents where crowds have listened to but not answered a call for 
help. Newspapers have tagged these incidents with the label 'apathy.' 
We have become indifferent, they say, callous to the fate of suffering 
others. The results of [these] studies lead to a different conclusion. The 
failure to intervene may be better understood by knowing the relation-
regard to helping behavior "the primary difference between men and women is that men are more 
likely to decide that intervention is not required because of their greater fear of appearing foolish or 
gullible."' /d. 
137. See Robert B. Zajonc, Social Facilitation, 149 SCIENCE. 269 (1965). According to Za-
jonc's studies, the arousal caused by stress or by the presence of others will facilitate a person's 
dominant response. In easy tasks, increased arousal leads to increased performance. In difficult 
tasks, increased arousal leads to decreased performance. See id. 
138. See supra Part II.A.2. 
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ship among bystanders rather than between a bystander and the vic-
tim.l39 
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However, this perspective also shows that the law could potentially 
be used to increase helping behavior. The law and people's morality 
form a kind of symbiotic relationship. 140 The law is shaped by the public 
morality, and the law shapes people's morality. 
Therefore, rather than imposing a general duty and harsh penalties 
for those who fail to rescue in an emergency situation, it may be more 
effective to impose a limited duty to help 1) in situations which pose no 
threat to the rescuer, or 2) when there is a special relationship as has been 
defined in the common law exceptions to the duty to rescue rule, the fail-
ure to rescue would result in a minor penalty. Imposing a duty to rescue 
would put people on notice of the need to rescue and help break down 
some of the psychological barriers which may prevent people from per-
forming a rescue. 
David N. Kelley 
139. LATANE, supra note 124, at 221. 
140. See Silver, supra note 26, at 428-29. 
